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PERU AND THE MYTH OF INDEPENDENT
STATEHOOD
Suzanne Wilhelm*
I. INTRODUCTION

The New World order, marked by increasing global
interdependence and free market economies, is a 'catch-22' for
postcolonial Third World' countries engaged in the continual struggle
for development.
Freed from the shackles of direct foreign
subjugation, former colonies around the world pursue 'independence'
- the power to make their own decisions and influence their own
destinies - by seeking to emulate powerful countries that appear to
have achieved independence through sustained growth of their
economies. Development is seen as the means for attaining the indicia
of independence: financial resources, military capability and political
clout. During the Cold War, development was characterized by
economic protectionism and the promotion of domestic industries. To
survive in the future, however, nations must now capture a share in the
global marketplace; they must compete. Capitalism and 'opening up'
to international free trade and commerce are proclaimed as salvation
from the economic turmoil suffered by Third World countries and
heralded as the new path to developmental progress--the benchmark of
independent statehood.
Paradoxically, development by way of
entering the global free market economy ultimately results in a further
loss of independence, as nations have even less control over their
economies and strive to make policy decisions to attract foreign
investment and further foreign interests.

LL.M. Columbia University School of Law, J.D. University of Detroit Mercy; Assistant Professor
of Business Law, Eastern New Mexico University. Formerly, International Legal Adviser to the
Honorable Carlos Torres y Toes Lara, Vice President of the Congress of Peru, 1996; Visiting Professor,
Catholic University of Peru Law Faculty and University of Lima Law Faculty 1994-1997; Intern, Center
for Justice and International Law 1993; Assistant Attorney General, Michigan Department of Attorney
General 1988-1994.
The term "Third World" is used with respect to nations that are in the process of development to
emphasize their subordinate rank in the world economic order.
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Perhaps no other Third World country has embraced the free
market rhetoric as fully as Peru. Keenly aware that it must follow the
tide, due to its subordinate position in the world's economic order,
current President Alberto Fujimori sees himself as preparing the
country to compete in the 21 st Century. Amidst extreme economic
chaos, civil war and political instability, when he came to power in
1990, Fujimori instituted an aggressive program for economic reform
designed to attract foreign investment by creating an open economy in
which foreign and domestic enterprise compete freely. 2 His vision
included the elimination of barriers to international trade and a
massive campaign to transfer ownership of Peru's state-owned
enterprises to foreign firms. He believed that for Peru, there was no
other way. Most Peruvian nationals lacked the financial resources for
a meaningful bail out, and the few fPossessed of wealth were
understandably reluctant to invest in Peru.
Enticing foreign companies to purchase state-owned businesses
proved difficult. Fujimori had to convince the world that terrorism
was under control, that the government was stable and that the
economy was improving. 4 The vigor with which Fujimori proceeded
to achieve these goals is impressive. The President's privatization
campaign has been one of the world's most aggressive, attracting
foreign investment from all parts of the globe.5 International trade has
sustained growth, with minor setbacks in 1998 due to 'El Nifio' and
the Asian crisis, and Peru has re-entered the international financial
community with fully restored borrowing capacity. However, these
actions have intensified Peru's dependence on foreign capital and have
led to governmental policy-making designed to further the economic
interests of foreign firms.
In one form or another, foreign interests have dominated Peru
since colonial times. Following independence from Spain in 1821,
Peru continued to depend on foreign capital from exports and sought
2 Alberto

Fujimori, Peru-The Time is Now, in CARLOS TORRES Y TORRES LARA, PERU: THE TIME

ISNOW-PROBLEMS AND SOLUTIONS (Suzanne Wilhelm trans.. 1997).
3 Felipe Larrain et al., Elements ofa Stabilization Program, ch. 3 in CARLOS E. PAREDES & JEFFREY
D. SACHS, PERU'S PATH TO RECOVERY (1991).
4id.

5 Peru, National Commission on Foreign Investment and Technology, 3 FOREIGN INVESTMENT
BULLETIN, Dec. 1998. (www.mef.gob.pe/peruinv/espboletin/pag3.htm).
6
1d.
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loans from international sources to finance operations. Privatization is
simply an extension of foreign participation in Peru's economy,
signaling a return to direct foreign control through ownership of key
industries and businesses. To ensure the health and viability of these
foreign owned enterprises general business principles tell us that
policy decisions must be made without regard to what is best for Peru
as an individual nation, or for the Peruvian people. Such is the 'price'
of development in today's world. Whether the cost is worth the gain is
a question that only the Peruvian people can answer. One thing,
however, is certain: In its quest for development, Peru has entered a
new era of foreign economic domination, and has lessened the
possibility of achieving 'independence' as a nation among equals.7
This article examines President Fujimori's strategy to make Peru
competitive in the new global order, arguing that extensive direct
foreign participation in the economy leads to foreign control, lessening
Peru's power to make decisions about its own future for the benefit of
the Peruvian people. Fujimori's 'success' is the result of several
factors. First, and perhaps most important, the international financial
community has been behind him all the way. He has honored the
wishes of the World Bank and International Monetary Fund (IMF).
Second, he instituted extensive structural reforms to attract foreign
investment by aligning Peru's constitution and laws with international
interests in creating an open global economy, even to the point of
remaking the constitution. Peru's laws to attract private foreign capital
serve as an example for other nations desiring to enter the global order
and provide an insight into how nations might influence international
free market law in the future. Finally, with very few deviations,
Fujimori has remained committed to his plan for economic reform in
the face of strong public criticism. I begin with an historical overview,
and then analyze the privatization of Telef6nica del Perai and
Petroperu in light of Peru's extensive structural reform. My analysis
reveals the extent of the President's commitment to foreign
participation in the economy, despite statistics indicating that absolute
poverty is increasing while Peru's economy is improving. If effective
7 Underlying the concept of the free market's ability to promote economic development is the
assumption that all nations should be treated equally in the world. However, all nations are not equal, and
equal treatment will not change that fact.
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competition in today's world, with its consequent increase in foreign
control in the case of Peru, leads to 'development', where then are the
benefits to the Peruvian people?
II. HISTORICAL CONSIDERATIONS
8

Spanish conquistadores appeared on Peruvian soil in 1532. Led
by Francisco Pizarro, an illiterate man of humble heritage 9 , Spanish
forces conquered the Inca and established Peru as the capital of the
Spanish Empire in the Americas. At that point in time, two great
cultures clashed. Inca civilization was agricultural, based on mutual
aid and solidarity made necessary by Peru's excessively difficult
geographic composition.' 0 Peru comprises the Andes Mountains,
barren coastal deserts, and the world's densest rain forest, the
Amazon." Survival for the Inca meant societal cooperation. They
worshiped deities like the sun god who could be seen and appreciated
2
for his brilliance.'
The Spaniards could not have been more different. Spain was a
fanatical Christian nation seeking riches in the New World. 13 Peru
was laden with gold and silver and Indians 14 to work the mines. The
Inca had conquered earlier civilizations in the region with gifts of
adornment, aid and food, placing the gods of the conquered peoples on
an equal footing with their own gods, thereby winning the respect and
admiration of those they conquered. 15 The Spaniards, however,
conquered the Inca by brutal force, exploited them mercilessly,
6
suppressing their religion and destroying their places of worship.'
The social structure built on solidarity was forced to give way to
individualistic profiteering, agriculture was replaced with mining, and
a See generally KENNETH J. ANDRIEN & ROLENA ADORNO, TRANSATLANTIC ENCOUNTERS,
EUROPEANS AND ANDEANS INTHE SIXTEENTH CENTURY (1991).
9 Luis MARTIN, THE KINGDOM OF THE SUN 21-23 (1974).
1oDAVID P. WERLICH, PERU, A SHORT HISTORY 32-33 (1994); See also WILLIAM H. PRESCOTT, EL
TRAJICO FIN DEL IMPERIO INCA 22-25 (1975)(Carlos M. de Dampierre trans.,1975).
11THOMAS M. DAVIES, JR., INDIAN INTEGRATION IN PERU 1 (1970).
12Prescott, supra note 10, at 17-20.
3
HENRY F. DOBYNS & PAUL L DOUGHTY, PERU: A CULTURAL HISTORY 57-62 (1976).
14The term Indian refers to the indigenous population, the Inca. Through intermarriage among the
Inca and the Spaniards, a race of Peruvians called 'Mestizo' developed. This racial group, however, is not
considered 'Indian'.
ISMartin, supra note 9, at 10.
16Id. at 71-75.
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a new invisible god claimed preeminence. These two cultures
managed to coexist, but the Inca were subjected to a system of
enforced racial separation.
The Spaniards never tolerated
integration. 17 Thus began Peru's long and tortured history of
colonialism.
Peru declared independence from Spain in 1821.18 Napoleon
Bonaparte had marched into Spain in 1808 and had dethroned the king,
thus creating an opportunity for the colonies which were adverse to the
new French regime. 19 Independence was initially achieved in South
America in the northern and southern regions. In Peru, the indigenous
communities had staged several unsuccessful revolts against the
Spaniards who, over time, had developed into two factions: 'Creoles'
who were born of Spanish heritage in Peru and Spaniards who were
immigrants from Spain. The Creoles advocated separation from
Spain, but could never join forces with the Indians out of distrust
common to both. A third group, the Mestizos, people of Spanish and
Indian descent, were torn between loyalty to the Spanish crown and
their Indian heritage. For these reasons, popular revolution was
impossible. Two foreigners, Sim6n Bolfvar of Venezuela, and Jos6 de
20
San Martfn of Argentina, led the liberation movement in Peru.
Fighting continued until 1823 when the last royal forces were
expelled.
Like most former colonies in Latin America, even after
independence foreign interests maintained control of the economy
through ownership of key industries and businesses. 2 1 Fortunes were
sustained and new ones made in the exploitation of Peru's vast natural
resources: from guano 22 , to oil, to gold. 23 The Creoles, Peru's elite
class, represented only a slight fraction of the population yet amassed
great wealth and power. They maintained the social system inherited
from their colonial ancestors of segregation and forced Indian labor,
17JESUS CHAVARRIA, JOSI CARLOS MARIATEGUI AND THE RISE OF MODERN PERU 1890-1930 107-

116 (1935).
'SDobyns, supra note 13, at 120-144.
Id. at 138.
Id. Bolfvar and San Martfn sought independence for Peru after successfully achieving
independence in their respective countries to assure that Spain could not re-assert control in the region.
21Chavarrfa, supra notel7, at 107-116.
22 Bird dung rich in nitrates used as fertilizer.
23Chavarrfa, supra note 17, at 160.
'9
20
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and continued to encourage the influx of foreign capital from exports
and foreign loans. 24
In the early 1900's, a new class-consciousness developed in Third
World countries struggling for freedom from colonial rule. Fueled by
a popular sentiment of anti-imperialism and nationalism, Peruvian
workers began to form unions and demand protection from
exploitation by the developed nations. 25 More than half a century
would pass, however, before Peru's export-oriented economy would
shift to the promotion of domestic industry, seeking to redistribute
income in a more equitable manner.26 Reform continued throughout
the 1970s, encouraged by the United Nations support for selfdetermination and the increased activism of Third World nations
globally. 27 Successive governments intervened in all spheres of
economic activity, expropriating vast private land holdings and
nationalizing the foreign controlled petroleum, mining and fishing
industries. 28 However, although waves of nationalism brought periods
of restricted foreign trade and economic protectionism designed to
promote Peru's domestic industrial sector, Peru's dependence on
foreign capital continued to grow. Oil exports increased substantially,
but high inflation and a growing budget deficit financed by external
2
sources led to enormous foreign debt. 1
By the 1980's, the oil export boom had ended. Inflation soared out
of control. State-owned enterprises were incurring substantial losses
due to inefficiency and improper administration. Peru, along with
other Latin American countries, faced serious economic difficulties.
Large state-owned businesses owed roughly 60% of Latin American
external debt. The demands for subsidies by these enterprises to
service the debt, bankrupted Latin American governments causing
wide-scale default on international loans.
Contentious debt
restructuring negotiations between international lenders and Latin
American governments left lenders hesitant to make new loans. At the
same time, equity investors refused to invest in Latin American
Id. at 216-224.
2 Id. at 148-153; Dobyns, supra note 13, at 224-23 1.
2 A. Javier Hamann & Carlos E. Paredes, The Peruvian Economy: Characteristicsand Trends, ch. I
in Paredes, supra note 3, at 60-72.
227 ANTONIO CASSES. SEL. -DETERMINATION OF PEOPLES, A LEGAL REAPPRAISAL 27 (1995).
Id. at 97.
29Id. at 66.
2
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countries out of fear of nationalization. These conditions led to the
30
Latin American debt crisis and access to external funds dried up.
Peru was unable to meet targets set by the IMF. Despite efforts to
stabilize the failing economy, the nation entered a new3 1decade of triple
digit inflation, budget deficits, and extreme recession.
Amidst this economic chaos, a bloody civil war began with the
Maoist terrorist group, Sendero Luminoso.32 Under the leadership of
Abimael Guzman, Sendero waged popular warfare in the countryside,
appealing to the poor and disenfranchised Indians in the mountainous
regions. Kept separate and subservient by the Spaniards, these people
33
spoke their native language, Quechua, and were largely illiterate.
Unlike neighboring Argentina and Chile, where indigenous peoples
had been exterminated, Peru's indigenous population had escaped
massacre by retreating into the mountainous regions of the Andes
where inclement conditions protected them from the onslaught
occurring
across the continent. They represented the silent majority in
34
Peru.
By 1990, Sendero had captured 60% of the national territory and
had destroyed construction and property valued at $25 billion, an
amount equal to Peru's external debt. Inflation was at 7,650% and
35
70% of the population was living in conditions of extreme poverty.
Thousands of people, fleeing terrorism, had converged on Lima, the
capital, and were living in cardboard slums at the city's edge without
electricity or running water. 36 There were over 200 state-owned
37
businesses incurring estimated annual losses of $2.5 billion.
President Alan Garcia had stopped the country's external debt
30 See

generally RICHARD

SCHAFFER ET

AL.. INTERNATIONAL

BUSINESS LAW AND ITS

ENVIRONMENT 634-35 (3d ed. 1996).
31Armando Cceres & Carlos E. Paredes, The Management of Economic Policy, 1985-1989, ch. 2 in
Paredes, supra note 3, at 80-100.
32 The terrorist group Movimiento Revolucionario Tupac Amara (MRTA) was also active during this
period. Less well known than Sendero, MRTA was responsible for the takeover of the Japanese
Ambassador's personal residence in Lima in December 1996.
33Carlos Torres y Torres Lara, Los Problemas Internos del Desarrollo: el Perd, in FORUM DEUSTO,
DESAROLLO Y PAZ EN AMtRICA LATINA: UNA VISI6N AUTOCRfiTICA DESDE EL SUR 39-51 (1995).
3
35

id.

id.
The slum problem, also called "pueblos jovenes" continues to be an important issue for the
government.
37Carlos Torres y Torres Lam, Brief Summary of the New Constitution of Peru, in PERU: THE TIME
ISNOW, supra note 2, at 89.
3

THIRD WORLD LEGAL STUDIES-1998-99

repayments, which resulted in Peru's virtual expulsion from the
international financial community and denial of further foreign
38
financial assistance.
When Alberto Fujimori emerged as the victor in the 1990
elections 39 , the cost of war, poverty relief and subsidizing state-owned
businesses had bankrupted the government. Fujimori, Peruvian-born
of Japanese ancestry, was relatively unknown in political circles,
which appealed to the impoverished population who were disillusioned
with traditional politics. Fujimori's new party 'Cambio 90-Nueva
Mayorfa' offered change.

III. ECONOMIC REFORM
Decisive action was necessary. Hyperinflation and economic
chaos had crippled the nation and loomed as the most urgent crisis
facing the new administration. With Peruvian nationals either unable
or uninterested in investing in Peru, economic recovery would require
a large influx of foreign capital from expanding exports, privatizing
state-owned businesses and securing loans from international sources.
State intervention and protectionism, coupled with the failure to
service the external debt obligations, had succeeded in isolating Peru. 4 '
Attracting foreign capital in the post Cold War era would require an
open economy, driven by market forces. Peru's standing with the
World Bank and IMF, along with other international lenders, had been
seriously jeopardized by Garcfa's refusal to pay the external debt, and
they insisted on rapid stabilization of the economy. 42 President
Fujimori's program for economic reform involved three phases: first,
'shock therapy' to stabilize the economy; second, structural reforms to
attract foreign investment; and third, massive privatization and debt
restructuring.
38Luis Alberto Arias, Fiscal Policy, ch. 6 in Paredes, supra note 3, at 228-237.
39In 1980, Fernando Beladnde was elected president, marking the return of democracy to Peru after

40 years of military rule. See generally Paredes, supra note 3, at 69. Accord U.S. Department of State,
Background Notes: Peru, March 1998.
40 Although Sendero had captured 60% of the national territory, its land holdings were in outlying,
sparsely populated areas. It had been unable to capture Lima, despite extensive bombing. This, coupled
with emigration to Lima from the countryside as frightened masses fled terrorism, led to a demographic
explosion that affected the electorate profoundly, contributing to Fujimori's success.
4' Paredes, supra note 3, at 70-7
1.
42

LARRY EVEREST, THE SELLING OF PERU (1994).

PERU AND THE MYTH OF STATEHOOD

A. Phase 1: 'Fujishock'
The initial phase was characterized by bold action. Gradual
measures, such as price controls and exchange rate manipulation, were
deemed impotent with inflation soaring. 43 Besides, such measures
were inconsistent with the President's strategy to free the economy
from arbitrary restraints that had resulted in a seriously inefficient
allocation of resources and price distortion." It was imperative that
Fujimori engender international confidence in his program for
economic reform arid his commitment to a free market economy. As a
result, he opted for 'shock treatment', slashing governmental subsidies
and price restraints and increasing the price of goods and services
supplied by state-owned businesses.45 The immediate result of this
action was an unprecedented acceleration of prices for basic
necessities like gasoline and food. The public was enraged; Fujimori
had made campaign Promises that he would not use shock therapy on
the failing economy. In response to public outcry, the administration
wavered in its commitment to the shock program, adjusting prices and
tampering with the exchange rate.47 These intermittent measures may
have caused unnecessary delay in the improvement of the economy,
but they humanely provided the suffering masses a reprieve. In any
event, by 1991, hyperinflation had ended.
B. Phase 2: Structural Reforms
The second phase of economic recovery, structural reform, began
in March of 1991. Import tariffs were reduced, and many quantitative
restrictions were eventually eliminated. Several state monopolies were
abolished. Labor law reforms made it easier to hire and fire
employees. Laws were introduced to promote competition and enable
foreigners to participate in the economy. 48 These changes, though
43Paredes, supra note 3, at 120, 299-300.
44id.
45Carlos E. Paredes, Epilogue: In the Aftermath of Hyperinflation, supra note 3, at 301-304.
4Id.
Fujimori may not have defeated Mario Vargas Liosa had he been more forthright about his
plans to use shock treatment, referred to as "cirug(a sin anestesta" (translated as surgery without
anesthesia). Nevertheless, in 1995, Fujimori was elected to a second term in office, which indicates that
the population had regained confidence in the President.
1
I at 307.
Id.
48Id. at 312.
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significant, were not 'sufficient'. Lack of support in the politically
fractured Congress, led to the so-called 'auto-coup' of 1992, in which
the President dissolved the Congress and suspended constitutional
rule. 49 Later, with the economy in active recovery and Sendero
Luminoso weakened by the capture of Guzman, Fujimori restored the
nation to constitutional rule. However, a new constitution was needed,
one designed to attract foreign investment and international business.
Important instances of structural reform include two laws enacted
in 1991.50 The first, Legislative Decree 662, the Law to Promote
Foreign Investment, is based on the principle of equal treatment of
foreign and national investment. Thus, article 2 guarantees: "Foreign
investment, and the companies in which they participate, shall have the
same rights and obligations as those of national investment and
companies .... The national laws shall, in no event, discriminate
against investment or companies on the basis of the national or foreign
investment participating therein". Other provisions make currency
freely convertible , establish equal treatment for foreign investment in
intangible property52 , and guarantee foreign investors the right to
freely engage in commercial and industrial activities. 53 Perhaps the
most significant provision of Legislative Decree 662 is Article 10.
This article promotes stability by permitting the government to enter
into contracts with foreign investors guaranteeing that the tax laws in
effect at the time the contract is entered into remain in force for the
duration of the agreement. 54 As of September 1998, the government
had entered into some 230 tax stabilizing contracts.55
The second law, Legislative Decree 757, the Framework Law for
Growth in Private Investment, eliminates legal and administrative
obstacles restraining private initiative. Article 1 provides: "The
objective of this law is to guarantee free initiative and private
investment, now or hereafter existing, in all economic activities and
49Torres Lara, Peru: The Time is Now, supra note 2. at 56-60.
so Decreto Legislativo No. 662, Ley de Promoci6n de la Inversi6n Extranjera (1991); Decreto
Legislativo 757, Ley Marco pam el Crecimiento de laInversi6n Privada (1991).
"PERU CONST. art. 7.
52Id. art. 5.
"Id. art. 6.
-4Similarly, article 12 of the Constitution guarantees the labor laws in effect at the time of contract.
"sFigures cited are reported by the National Commission on Foreign Investment and Technology,
Foreign Investment Bulletin, supra note 5.
Id.
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under any corporate or contract form authorized by the Constitution
and the laws". Article 4 guarantees freedom of competition under the
law of supply and demand, article 8 guarantees private property, and
article 12 prohibits discriminatory practices with regard to exchange
controls, prices, and tariffs.
These laws initiated Fujimori's plan to attract foreign investment
in Peru. They were intended to demonstrate the administration's
commitment to an open economy by assuring foreign firms of equal
treatment, thus lessening the fear of nationalization and
expropriation.56 'Tax stability contracts', as they have come to be
called, are an added incentive. Nevertheless, making a law that says
that private initiative is free does not make it so. Peru's lack of a
foundation in open economic structures, and its image as a nation with
difficulty adhering to the 'rule of law', an image shared by the
Peruvian people, hampered the effectiveness of these new laws. They
remain important today, however, due to the new Constitution that
purports to change the very structure of the country and its economy.
The Constitution of 1993 is significant in many respects.5 7 It
responds to the globalization of the economy by accepting that
individual nations no longer control their own economies. It thus
seeks to 'inject' Peru into the international economy by establishing an
open economic regime in which private enterprise is free to both
foreigners and nationals.5 8 However, the new regime is not a liberal
capitalist economic regime but, instead, one in which the state must act
to regulate the economy to seek a more equitable distribution of social
benefits among its citizenry.5 9 Thus, article 58 specifies that private
initiative is to be "exercised within a social market economy", listing
5 It should also be noted that between 1994 and September 1998, Peru entered into twenty-five
bilateral and multilateral trade agreements granting protection and guarantees to foreign investment. The
United States and Peru have not concluded such an agreement.
57 Indeed, the circumstances under which the new Constitution was adopted are extraordinary.
The
President dissolved the Congress on 5 April 1992 in an act of self-preservation. The Congress was badly
fractured, and insurrection was imminent. After the coup, under the supervision of the Organization of
American States, a temporary congress was elected by the Peruvian people to draft the new Constitution.
See generally, CARLOS TORRES YTORRES LARA, Los NuDOS DEL PODER (1992). Carlos Torres y Torres
Lara was President of the Congressional Committee on the Constitution, which drafted the new
Constitution. During his distinguished career in public service he has served as Prime Minister, and Vice
President of the Congress of Peru. He is former Dean of the University of Lima Law Faculty, where he
still teaches. I was privileged to serve as international legal advisor in his congressional chambers.
58 Torres Lara, Peru: The Time is Now, supra note 2,at 69,96-100.
59
d.
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the following national priorities: promotion of employment, health,
education, security, public services and infrastructure. 60 Of special
importance are the protection of small businesses and agrarian
development. 6' In addition, free enterprise is open to Peruvian
nationals and foreigners, who are treated equally. 62 Further, the "state
63
guarantees free possession and disposition of foreign currency".
These measures are buttressed by article 61, which ensures free market
competition and prohibits monopolies and all practices that abuse
dominant market position. Thus, the new Constitution creates an open
climate for international commerce and foreign investment.64
Further clearing the way for foreign investment, the Constitution of
1993 respects private property and freedom to contract. It provides
that the right to property is inviolable 65, and specifies that property is
subject to equal treatment whether owned by nationals or foreigners,
except that foreigners may not appeal to diplomatic protection. 66 In its
treatment of property rights, the new Constitution differs very little
from its predecessor. However, what is new is that the Constitution
guarantees that "parties may validly agree according to the legal norms
in force at the time of the contract. Contract terms may not be
modified by law or other dispositions of any type". 67 Under the
former Constitution, state intervention in private contractual relations
was so pervasive that it had practically destroyed confidence in
contract as a manner of securing performance in business operations. 68
Article 61 further provides that contractual disputes are to be settled by
69
judicial resolution or arbitration.
W

PERU CONST. art. 58.

61 PERU CONST. arts. 59, 88.
62 PERU CONST. art. 63: "National and foreign investment are subject to the same conditions."
63

PERU CONST. art. 64.
6 PERU CONST. art. 63, providing that Peru may practice protectionism "If another country or
countries adopt protectionism or discriminatory measures that prejudice national interests".
65PERU CONST. art. 70.
66PERU CONST. art. 71, restricting foreign ownership, by any means, of mines, lands, forests, waters,
combustibles,
or other sources of energy within fifty kilometers of Peruvian borders.
67
PERU CONST. art. 62.
6 Torres Lam, Peru: The Time is Now, Problems & Solutions, supra note 2, at 75.
69 In its exhortation of faith in the judicial resolution of contractual disputes, article 61 appears
oblivious to the well-known lack of independence suffered by the Peruvian judiciary. Nevertheless,
article 139 attempts to establish the judiciary as an independent organ of the government, and various
programs to correct the injustice occasioned by bribery, political manipulation and lack of judicial training
are currently underway. See generally United Nations Program for Development, Nuevas Perspectivas
para la Reforma Integral de la Administracitn de la Justicia en el Perd (1994).
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Finally, the new Constitution profoundly changes the State's
competence to engage in business activities. Article 60 provides:
"Only where authorized by express law, may the State engage in
subsidiary business activity, directly or indirectly, for reasons of high
public interest or manifest national convenience". 7 0 These changes are
designed to suppress the 'inefficient' operation of businesses by
bureaucrats motivated by political interests instead of profit incentives.
The former Constitution mandated that the state exercise its business
activities "with the goal to promote the economy, provide public
services and achieve the objectives of development". 71 However,
unscrupulous individual bureaucrats seeking to promote their own
interests through bribery, excessive expenditures, hiring and
promotions on the basis of political affiliations,
and other
72
inappropriate actions impeded these lofty goals.
The implications of these changes, particularly the last mentioned,
are not yet clear. While the new Constitution ostensibly creates an
open economy and, as a practical matter, foreign firms have been
quick to take advantage of the new openness, public opinion is
seriously divided on the issue of President Fujimori's massive
campaign to transfer ownership of state-owned businesses to
foreigners. Furthermore, the exact meaning of the constitutional
language is subject to interpretation by the Congress. For example,
what is the meaning of the language, in article 60, that provides an
exception to the general rule of no state engagement in business
activity by allowing the state to engage in 'subsidiary' business
activities "for reasons of high public interest or manifest national
convenience"? Might it not allow the government to enter the market
and compete with private concerns, or take control of a business where
private interests could jeopardize the 'public good'? It should be kept
in mind that, even though the Constitution explicitly limits presidential
terms to two 73, in 1996 the Congress passed legislation interpreting the
74
Constitution to allow Fujimori to seek a third term as president.
70

PERU CONST. alt. 60.
71PERU CONST. art. 113 (1979).
72Torres
7

Laa, Peru: The Time is Now, Problems & Solutions, supra note 2, at 28.

3PERU CONST. art.
112.

74 The Constitution was adopted in 1993, while Fujimori was already in office. Therefore, his
election in 1995 was actually his first term under the new Constitution. He is thus entitled to seek another
term, which will count as his second.
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Thus Peru's Constitution appears subject to easy and open
'reinterpretation'.
Actions like these will not foster faith in the
Constitution as a fundamental document, nor engender trust in Peru's
ability to function under the rule of law.
C. Phase 3: Restructuring the Debt and Privatization
Fujimori's commitments to world trade and open foreign
investment have won international approval. Although the President's
reputation in the international community suffered after the auto-coup
of 1992, he has generally been applauded by the international financial
community for his vigorous approach to economic reform. In late
1991, he began to service the external debt in an attempt to restore
faith in Peru's financial integrity. 75 In March 1993, he announced that,
with the help of Japan and the United States, Peru had paid arrears
accruing since 1986 - when Garcfa stopped paying - to the World
Bank and IMF.76 In 1996, negotiations with international commercial
lenders and the Paris Club 77 to restructure the debt were successful;
both the level of debt and its structure are now compatible with Peru's
ability to pay.78
Currently, the Ministry of the Economy and Finance reports that
Peru has no domestic debt or external short-term debt. The average
maturity for Peru's external debt is 10 years, with more than 60% of
the debt carrying fixed interest rates. 79 The enormity of these changes
cannot be overlooked. Compared to the condition of Peru's external
debt when Fujimori took office in 199080, he has clearly been
As a result, the
successful in managing the country's debt.

75Felipe Larrain & Jeffrey D. Sachs, International Financial Relations, ch. 7 in Paredes, supra note
3, at 228-333.
76Reuters, Government Pays Old IMF. World Bank Debts (March 19. 1993).
7 The Paris Club is a group of financial investors/lenders, including trade credit suppliers, that
provide financing to governmental entities. While the World Bank and IMF do not grant debt reduction as
part of relief programs as a general rule, commercial lenders, banks and the Paris Club are quite generous
in this respect.
7s Jorge Baca Campoddnico, The Peruvian Economy: Recent Developments and Outlook (1998)
(www.mef.gob.pe/necon/index.htm).
79 id.

go As previously mentioned, under the former administration of Alan Garcfa, the external debt
obligations were not paid. As of December 1989, total external debt was $19.36 billion, with accrued
interest obligations of $1.57 billion. See Paredes, supra note 3. at 228-232.
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international financial community has made Peru an example of what
Third World countries can achieve in the new global order.
Privatization also began in late 1991. Soon after the promulgation
of Legislative Decrees 662 and 757, the President announced plans to
sell an initial list of 23 state-owned businesses. 81 In the first 10
months of the privatization campaign, enterprises were sold at the
astonishing rate of one each month. 82 During the next 33 months, 40
state-owned businesses were sold. 3 By September 1998, foreign
direct investment had reached $5.441 billion with Spain, the United
States and the United Kingdom representing the lion's share of
investment. 84 Although foreign investment reaches all sectors of
economic activity in Peru, communications, energy, industry
and
85
firms.
foreign
by
investment
largest
the
for
account
mining
Despite its 'success', President Fujimori's massive and energetic
privatization campaign has received a mixed reaction from the national
population. Public opinion is sharply divided on the issue of foreign
direct investment in the economy. Peruvian nationals resent the
ownership and exploitation by already rich Western companies of its
businesses and domestic industries. When the telephone company was
sold to a Spanish firm in 1994, the Peruvian people said little as they
were hopeful that advanced Western technology would bring down the
cost of telephone installation and service so that average Peruvian
families could afford to have a telephone. Two years later, however,
when Petroperu, the state-owned oil monopoly, was broken into
segments and auctioned off to the highest bidder, the citizenry cried
out in anguish. Would the Peruvian people never reap the benefits of
their own rich natural resources? Even after 500 years of colonial rule,
was there no escape from foreign domination?
The privatization of Telef6nica del Perti and Petroperuexemplify
Fujimori's fervor to transfer ownership of state-owned businesses to
'

Id.at 312.

12A. Javier Hamann et al., Macroeconomic Guidelinesfor Resuming Growth, ch. 5 in Paredes.supra
note 3, at 185. Economists had projected a much lengthier process, due to the poor condition of the stateowned businesses.
83 Caretas, Enigma Privatizador, 1996 (www.caretas.com.pe/1398). During this period, Daniel
Hokama, Minister of the Presidency, divested the nation of its "joyas de la familia" (translated as "family
jewels").
" National Commission on Foreign Investment and Technology, supra note 5.
5Id.
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foreign firms. These cases are among the most controversial of the
privatizations in Peru: Telef6nica del Peru' for the President's
withdrawal of shares from domestic investment in plain preference for
foreign investors, and Petroperu for his insistence on the piecemeal
sale of the oil industry in the face of strong opposition by a majority of
the population. 86 They are examined in the next section of the article.
1.

Telef6nica del Peru

In 1994, a controlling interest in Telef6nica del Perti, the stateowned Telephone Company, was sold to a Spanish firm.87 It was
Peru's first major privatization effort. The President proclaimed the
sale a great victory for the Peruvian people: service would improve
due to advanced technology and the cost of installation and monthly
usage would drop as greater efficiency stimulated productivity. Soon
all Peruvians would enjoy what industrialized peoples take for granted:
a telephone.
Almost immediately, the Spaniards dropped the cost of installing a
telephone line from approximately $500 to $270, offering a credit
plan. Families too poor to buy food, with no previous credit
experience, were signing up left and right, lured by the concept of
'payment over time'. The initial down payment varied and the
contract specified that any missed installments would result in
forfeiture of the deposit and any amounts paid, as well as the new
telephone line. Monthly usage was billed separately; missing a
payment on usage would result in disconnection of service, but not
termination of the installment contract. Many families lost their down
payments to the Spaniards and the company repossessed their
telephone lines; others struggled along keeping up with the installation
payments, but without telephone -service due to the inability to pay
their monthly usage. 88 This exploitation by the Spaniards gave rise to
a rash of destructive activities as public telephones were ripped out
and destroyed or stolen.

86
87

Caretas, supra note 83.
National Commission on Foreign Investment and Technology, supra note 5.

U These are my personal observations while living in Peru from August 1994 until January 1997.
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The government had retained a 28.6% interest in the company,
which was offered in shares to domestic and international investors.
The domestic stock offering included subsidized credit, discounts for
cash purchases and share bonus incentives. However, just weeks after
initiating a multi-million dollar campaign aimed at enticing Peruvians
to buy the stock, the government cut the number of shares reserved for
domestic buyers in half. This action was reportedly taken after an
89
unexpectedly large demand for the stock by international investors.
As a result, of the 28.6% interest retained by the government, the
majority of shares have been sold to foreign investors.
Fujimori's plan involved open participation by both national and
foreign investors in a free market economy, stimulated by opportunity
for gain. This vision of "popular capitalism" 9° implemented in the first
instance with the privatization of Telef6nica del Peril, sparked the
interest of national investors from all walks of life. They saw an
opportunity for personal gain through ownership of company stock.
Even the very poor in Peru were jumping at the chance to participate.
Clearly this phenomenon, new in Peru, was a sign that the population
had confidence in the free market reforms initiated by Fujimori. When
the President cut back on shares available for domestic purchase, he
demonstrated a preference for foreign investors in Peru, to the
prejudice of national investors who were eager to purchase shares.
Peruvian bankers warned that this action would damage Peru's image
of popular capitalism and engender distrust for future privatization
campaigns.9 1 A clear bias against national investors runs counter to an
open market economy, and sends a message to Peruvians about the
President's economic reforms. They appear designed to benefit
foreigners, not average Peruvians.
Thus, the two-class system
imposed upon Peru by the Spaniards in 1531 remains in force today.
In June 1998, the government announced that the company had
agreed to a modification of its purchase contract. 92 As an incentive to
the buyer, the original contract had provided the company a monopoly
position in the telecommunications industry until June 1999. The new
contract changed that date to 1 August 1998, allowing an immediate
89El Comercio, After Privatization Push, Government Cuts Available Shares, July 4, 1996.

9 Id.
91 Id.

92El Comercio, Monopolio de Telef6nica del Perd Termin6 desde elI de Agosto, June 8. 1998.
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increase in the cost of telephone service, but specifying a two year
additional period in which the company must cut the cost of
installation to $150. On 1 June 1998, Supreme Decree 021-98-MTC
was published in the official digest setting out the requirements
for
93
new providers wanting to enter the telecommunications market.
What had provoked these changes? In its announcement, the
government cited the improvement in conditions brought about by the
new company, namely the diffusion of telephone services throughout
Peruvian society due to the lowering of the installation costs, as
reasons for the change. But why would the company agree to the loss
of its preferential market position prior to the originally specified date?
In exchange, it did receive a rate increase and the initial phase of
capital and technological investment had ended, thus reducing the need
for market protection. However, more telling perhaps is the fact that
with the acquisition of Entel, S.A., the National Telecommunications
Company, Telefdnica del Perd owns 97.25% of all foreign investment
in Peru's telecommunications industry.94 Thus, there is little to fear
from open competition, and much to gain from the image of being an
active player in an open market economy.
Privatization should work to promote efficiency and lower the cost
of production, resulting in savings to pass on to consumers. This
depends, of course, on the market being open to competition that
creates the incentive to lower prices. In the case of Telef6nica del
Peril,the initial sale involved a protected monopoly for a limited time
period followed by opening the industry to market competition.
However, the Spanish firm has been able to secure ownership of a
controlling interest in the industry. Setting aside the issue of whether
foreign, as opposed to national, ownership of the telecommunications
industry is a good thing for Peru, privatization cannot have the
intended affect of lowering prices if market competition is not real.
There was little public comment when Telef6nica del Perdi was
sold. Privatization was new and the majority of the population could
not afford the cost of installation. But the Peruvian people were
hopeful. Although the cost of installation has decreased significantly,
the increase in cost of monthly service and usage lessens the
93 id.
94

See National Commission on Foreign Investment and Technology, supra note 5.
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probability that more Peruvians will enjoy telephone service. 'Open
competition' in telecommunications seems unlikely to have the effect
of lowering the price of consumption to the point at which ordinary
Peruvians will be able to finally have a telephone.95 Nevertheless, the
Spanish firm did bring the telephone line into a great many poor
households, thus expanding access, if only for the future, and it has
brought increased technology in the form of cellular phones and pagers
to the very few Peruvians who can actually afford them.
2.

Petroperu

By far the most controversial privatization in Peru has been that of
Petroperu,the national oil monopoly. By the time the privatization of
The
Petroperu was announced, public sentiment had soured.
piecemeal sale of the oil industry provoked critical public comment
from the start. The northern communities and workers lamented that
privatization of the oil company would put them out of jobs and
deepen the critical condition of poverty in the region and in the nation
as a whole. 96 A clear majority of Peruvians rejected the privatization
on populist grounds, ignoring the President's claims that exports had
bottomed out, state-owned businesses were incurring substantial
losses, and the government lacked the financial resources to invest in
much needed technology for exploration and exploitation.97 While
citizens collected signatures to stop the sale by referendum, President
Fujimori steadfastly moved forward.
To attract foreign buyers, in addition to the ample protection
afforded foreign investors in Legislative Decrees 662 and 757 and the
Constitution of 1993, the government enacted the Organic Law for
Hydrocarbons. 98 Under this law, hydrocarbons belong to the State and
99
are administered by Perupetro, a state agency created by the law.
Rights in extracted hydrocarbons are transferred to licensees under
contract according to article 13, and foreign and domestic individuals
5 Id. The United Kingdom and Panama own Tele2000, expected to be the main competitor.
96 Caretas, supra note 83.
97Paredes, supra note 3, at 45-46.

98Law No. 26221. A copy of the Hydrocarbon law can be found at
httpJ/200.4.200.194/teleley/bu1692.htm.
SId. at art. 8.
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or corporations may enter into licensing contracts throughout the
national territory, including areas within 50 kilometers of the
frontiers.l1° The licensee provides all technical and financial resources
needed to implement contracts' 0 ', which are governed by the income
tax law in effect at the time the contract is entered into. !° 2 Imports of
goods and the expenditure required for activities during the
exploration phase of the contract are free from taxation.1' 3 Exports of
hydrocarbons are exempt from taxation. 1°4 Tax and exchange systems
in force at the time the contract is entered into remain in force during
the entire life of the contract.' 05 The Central Reserve Bank of Peru
guarantees the availability of foreign exchange accruing to licensees,
who may freely use and dispose of such currency within Peru and
abroad. 1°6 Finally, the law of supply and demand governs activities
and prices of crude oil and derived products. 10 7 These protections
were designed to attract foreign capital and technology capable of
exploiting Peru's oil reserves for export.
Despite public disapproval, in August 1996, a consortium
comprised of three international oil companies, Repsol of Spain, YPF
of Argentina and Mobil Oil of the United States, purchased a 60%
stake in La Pampilla,Peru's largest oil refinery. 108 The dismembering
of Petroperu continues, with foreign interests from 9around the world
0
participating in the privatization of the oil industry.'
Although President Fujimori ultimately ignored the strong public
objection to selling the oil industry to foreign firms, civil unrest and
rioting postponed privatization for almost one year and resulted in a
0
10% share of La Pampilla being transferred to refinery workers."1
100
Compare with the Constitution's prohibition against foreign ownership of lands located within 50
kilometers of the borders. PERU CONST. art. 70, supra note 65. Even though foreigners cannot own the
land, they can secure rights to hydrocarbons through licenses.
'0' Law No. 26221, art. 27.
'02 Id. at art. 48.
103Id. at art. 56.
04

'

Id. at art. 58.

o5 Id. at art. 63.
'06id. at art. 66.

Id. at art. 77.
logReuters, Peru's La Painpilla Refinery Soldjor $180.5 Million, June I1, 1996.
IS') Petr6leos del Peril, Procesos de Privatizacin (Aug. 28, 1998)
'07

(www.getroperu.com/petro/petro7.htm).
U. S. Energy Information Administration, Peru (Jan. 1998)
(www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/pgen/ch3g.html).
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Despite this gesture, privatization had come to mean foreign
ownership and there was nothing in it for the average Peruvian
national. Moreover, downsizing created hardship as many workers
lost their jobs and, unlike telephone services, oil is a non-renewable
natural resource. Although the government retained a 'golden share'
in Petroperu to maintain a presence in the oil industry and avoid a
foreign takeover', when the oil reserves are depleted the golden share
will be worthless. Peruvian nationals will never reap the benefits of
exploiting their own natural resources in oil.
The President's disregard of the popular will is instructive in
several respects. First, it shows that Fujimori will not be swayed by
popular anti-privatization sentiment: that a majority of Peruvians
rejected the plan did not stop the privatization."11 He persevered in
what he believed to be best for the country. It may well be that the
Peruvian people do not know what is in their best interests and, as if
they are children, a paternalistic government must make decisions for
their welfare. Perhaps this is the meaning of Peru's 'social market
economy'. In any event, it is antithetical to democratic rule and
further erodes Peru's image of popular capitalism. The Peruvian
people, unable to participate in their economy, also lack the power to
prevent the transfer of ownership of key industries to foreign interests
through democratic means.
Second, it is noteworthy that the international financial community
can support Fujimori's economic reforms under these circumstances.
As Philip Alston notes, respect for the globalization of the open market
has emerged as an element that can trump other values.1 3 As an
example, Alston points to human rights norms, noting: "In the world
of globalization, a strong reaction against gender and other forms of
discrimination... can often require not only a showing that the
relevant practices run counter to human rights standards but also a
"' The golden share is employed by governments to retain a voice in the continuing operations of
the company even after a controlling interest is sold to private investors. It functions by limiting the
voting rights of private investors, giving the government a veto power over decisions by the board of
directors of the company, or placing government appointees on the board. See generally, International
Business Law and Its Environment, supranote 30.
112 It should be noted that to date, the population has not rejected the privatization of Petroperu by
referendum.
113Philip Alston, The Myopia of the Handmaidens: InternationalLawyers and Globalization", 8
EUR. J. INT'L L. 435 (1997).

THIRD WORLD LEGAL STUDIES-1998-99
demonstration that they are offensive to the imperatives of economic
efficiency and the functioning of the free market". 1 4 Perhaps
participatory democracy is an outmoded value in the new order of
market driven economic management.

IV. PERU TODAY
President Fujimori's three-phase strategy for economic reform has
clearly been successful in terms of the global market. Hyperinflation
was brought to a halt, and since 1991 annual inflation has dropped to
6.0%, the lowest in 25 years. 115 Structural reform has attracted private
foreign investment, which has grown at an average annual rate of
14.2% from 1993 until 1997. 16 In the same period, the economy grew
at an average annual rate of 7.3%l 17, and international reserves reached
$10.5 billion, an amount sufficient to insulate Peru from external
shocks like the failure of Mexico in 1995 and the Asian stock crisis of
1996.118 Exports are also growing, although the country still suffers a
trade deficit 9,and Peru is meeting its external debt obligations.
The question then becomes whether divesting the nation's business
holdings to foreign interests has been worth the gain. The objectives
of encouraging foreign participation in the economy through direct
investment are to attract foreign capital, achieve access to technology,
and exploit natural resources through the export activities of foreign
investors. Economic statistics indicate that Peru is enjoying an inflow
of foreign capital, but the trade deficit persists. Although exports are
expected to continue growing as new mineral and energy sources are
discovered and exploited, it is doubtful that the current trade balance
will be reversed to reflect a surplus. Mineral extraction and energy
production require a technological capability that Peru does not
possess. This technology is currently being imported from developed
nations, further contributing to the current deficit.

14Id.at

442.

15 National Statistics Institute of Peru, IndicadoresEconemicos (1998) (www.inei.gob.pe).
6 Campodtnico, supra note 78.
::7id.

118
Id.
119Id.
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Furthermore, much of the foreign participation in Peru's economy
is directed towards export activities.
As a result, capital and
technological investment in Peru is made on the basis of strategies for
global competition in these sectors, not on considerations of what is
best for Peru's economy and population. Only carefully selected
sectors of the economy are destined for technological investment.
Currently, these sectors are mining and energy production. 12 Other
sectors, those controlled by domestic firms, are deprived of
technological advancement. Consequently, they will become less and
less competitive, both at home and abroad. This will also contribute to
the trade deficit as imported products replace domestic products in an
open market.
In addition, most of Peru's export industries, mineral extraction
and energy production, are capital intensive. As a result, new jobs will
not be forthcoming. In fact, downsizing can be expected as the new
owners compete for market share in the global economy. As an
additional matter, environmental degradation is almost a certainty.
Although Peruvian law provides protection for the environment121, as a
practical matter the government lacks funds for aggressive
enforcement of these laws.
Finally, the anticipated 'trickle down' to the impoverished masses
has not occurred. Like at other times in Peru's history, the country
appears to be improving economically yet the vast majority of the
population receives no benefit whatsoever. 122 The privatization of
Petroperu has resulted in exploration and exploitation of oil reserves,
but fewer jobs for Peruvian workers. And as a result of Spanish
ownership of Telef6nica del Perg, there are lots of telephone lines, but
very few telephones.
V. CONCLUSION

When Peru was sinking into the abyss of hyperinflation, crippling
civil war and political disintegration, Fujimori took action, swiftly and
12 See National Commission on Foreign investment and Technology, supra note 5.
121 For an example, see art. 87 of the Organic Law for Hydrocarbons. supra note 98, requiring
foreign firms to comply with laws to protect the environment, with termination of their contract as a
possible penalty.
122 Dobyns, supra note 13, at 247.
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boldly, to save the country. And he did save the country. It is easy to
criticize his methods, although few capitalist thinkers would deny that
private ownership is better for business and that governments should
confine their efforts to providing public services like transportation
and education. The controversy centers on the issue of whether it is in
the best interests of a poor nation like Peru for the government to
maintain ownership of state-owned enterprises that it cannot make
profitable rather than selling them to foreigners. There is no easy
answer.
Fujimori's decision to sell to foreigners has thrust Peru into the
global marketplace.
As the cases of Telef6nica del Pera and
Petroperu reveal, his economic agenda has inured to the benefit of
foreign investors and not to the average Peruvian. The President's
rationale was that economic prosperity, in time, would leak through
the cracks in the walls that separate the members of Peruvian society
who enjoy a decent standard of living from the great number of
impoverished masses. But the walls are old ones erected by the
Spaniards when they first exploited the Inca. The Spaniards imposed
their culture on Peru, enforcing racial separation, maintaining the
indigenous population in a subservient state of illiteracy and poverty to
further their own interests. Class antagonism prevented Peru from
achieving independence from Spain through popular revolution.
Instead, Peru waited for deliverance. Today, Peru is multi-cultural and
multi-ethnic yet many Peruvians do not speak Spanish and live in
unspeakable conditions of poverty as the separation of classes
continues to stifle Peruvian society.
Peru is the case of a people interrupted in its development by
strong foreign interests that usurped the benefits that the country had
to offer, siphoning off the value for themselves. Peru, like other
former colonies, has a long history of foreign domination. Formal
independence has not been able to wrench control over natural
resources and the economy from the developed Western nations. Even
in times of great nationalistic trends, foreign capital has continued to
play a dominant role.
Privatization is simply an extension of foreign control in Peru, an
evil President Fujimori deemed necessary for the sake of development.
Foreign capital makes savings and builds infrastructure.
But
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development is not the result of correctly following a recipe for
economic growth. Nor can economic growth bestow independence
upon a country that can do little else than respond to the dictates of
foreign interests. There is a delicate balance between attracting
foreign capital to improve a country's economic viability so that it can
one day function on its own, and directing the economy towards
foreign interests such that it becomes increasingly dependent on
foreign capital and technology to survive.
Isolation is no longer an option for any country; globalization is
today's development game and to play, nations must privatize stateowned businesses, deregulate, open their markets and downsize their
governments. 23 However, a moderate mix of the means for entering
the global economic order may better serve the interests of
underdeveloped countries like Peru. The developed nations can afford
24
the risk of globalization; they control the global economic agenda.
For Peru, however, domestic interests become less important as
dependency on foreign participation grows. Peru cannot hope to
influence the international agenda and therefore, it cannot influence its
own destiny. Peru's structural reforms cater to foreign investment and
export activities. The entire economy hinges on the influx of foreign
capital. Thus Peru enters the New World of global markets not as a
player, but as a pawn, and a new era of colonialism begins.

23See generally Alston, supra note 113.
24 For an informative discussion of the nature of the global agenda, offering differing viewpoints as
to "who" sets the agenda, see Alston, id.

